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Abstract. Additive Manufacturing (AM), a.k.a. 3D Printing, is increas-
ingly used to manufacture functional parts of safety-critical systems.
AM’s dependence on computerization raises the concern that the AM
process can be tampered with, and a part’s mechanical properties sabo-
taged. This can lead to the destruction of a system employing the sabo-
taged part, causing loss of life, financial damage, and reputation loss. To
address this threat, we propose a novel approach for detecting sabotage
attacks. Our approach is based on continuous monitoring of the current
delivered to all actuators during the manufacturing process and detection
of deviations from a provable benign process. The proposed approach has
numerous advantages: (i) it is non-invasive in a time-critical process, (ii)
it can be retrofitted in legacy systems, and (iii) it is airgapped from the
computerized components of the AM process, preventing simultaneous
compromise. Evaluation on a desktop 3D Printer detects all attacks in-
volving a modification of X or Y motor movement, with false positives
at 0%.
Keywords: Additive manufacturing, 3D printing, Cyber physical secu-
rity, Side channel analysis, Attack detection
1 Introduction
Additive Manufacturing technology (AM), a.k.a. 3D Printing, is receiving im-
mense attention due to the potential for improvements in product performance,
decreased development times, and reduced costs. As compared to either tradi-
tional, “subtractive” manufacturing methods in which material is removed from
a part via machining or the use of pre-fabricated dies (e.g. investment casting,
die casting, injection molding) which necessitate substantial investments in cap-
ital equipment, longer lead times, and associated labor costs, AM allows for
the production of components with minimum material waste, shorter design-to-
production times, and economical, on-demand production of niche parts.
These advantages enable a broad range of applications, ranging from models



















2the latter is the FAA-approved fuel nozzle for General Electric’s LEAP jet en-
gine [7]. Further examples of components produced using AM techniques include
medical implants [13,9], air ducts [8], and tooling [12]. According to the Wohlers
Report [17], a renowned annual survey of advances in AM, in 2015 the AM indus-
try accounted for $5.165 billion of revenue, with 32.5% of all AM-manufactured
objects used as functional parts. A study conducted by Ernst & Young [6] shows
rapidly growing adoption of this technology worldwide. In the U.S. alone, 16% of
surveyed companies have experience with AM and another 16% are considering
adopting this technology in the future. The current world leader of AM adoption
is Germany with 37% of surveyed companies already using and a further 12%
considering AM.
Because of AM’s dependence on computerization, there is a growing concern
that the AM process can be tampered with, in order to sabotage a part’s me-
chanical properties. While several studies have sabotaged a part’s mechanical
properties in a lab [15,20,22], a recent dr0wned study [2] has proven experimen-
tally that a complete sabotage attack is possible.
To address the emerging security threat, in this paper we propose and evalu-
ate a novel solution for detecting sabotage attacks in AM. The proposed solution
is based on a monitoring of current supplied to individual actuators and the
detection of anomalies in this data. The proposed approach has numerous ad-
vantages: (i) it is non-invasive in a time-critical process (ii) it can be retrofitted
in legacy systems, and (iii) it can be easily air-gapped from the computerized
components involved in the AM process, increasing the difficulty of simultaneous
compromise.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After discussing related
work in Section 2 and describing an attack model in Section 3, we present details
of the proposed solution in Section 4. We present an experimental evaluation of
the proposed solution in Section 5. After discussing the applicability of the pro-
posed solution to industrial-grade metal AM systems in Section 6, we conclude
this paper with a short review and an outline of planned future work.
2 Related Work
While researchers have already discussed various threats in the context of AM,
such as Intellectual Property (IP) and manufacturing legally prohibited objects,
only sabotage attacks and proposed detection methods are of relevance to this
paper.
Sturm et al., 2014 [15] demonstrated that a part’s tensile strength can be
degraded by introducing defects such as voids (internal cavities). Zeltmann et
al., 2016 [22] showed that similar results can be achieved by printing part of the
structure with the contaminated material. Belikovetsky et al, 2017 [2] proposed
degrading a part’s fatigue life; the authors argue that the defect’s size, geometry,
and location are factors in the degradation. Yampolskiy et al, 2015 [20] argued
that the anisotropy intrinsic to 3D printed parts can be misused to degrade a
part’s quality, if an object is printed in the wrong orientation. Zeltmann et al.,
32016 [22] have experimentally shown the impact of this attack on a part’s tensile
strength, using 90 and 45 degree rotations of the printed model. Chhetri et al.,
2016 [3] introduced a skew along one of the build axes as an attack. Moore et
al., 2016 [10] modified the amount of extruded source material to compromise
the printed object’s geometry. Pope et al., 2016 [11] identified that indirect ma-
nipulations like the modification of network command timing and energy supply
interruptions can be potential means of sabotaging a part. Yampolskiy et al.,
2015 [20] discussed various metal AM process parameters whose manipulation
can sabotage a part’s quality; for the powder bed fusion (PBF) process, the
identified parameters include heat source energy, scanning strategy, layer thick-
ness, source material properties like powder size and form, etc. Slaughter et al.,
2017[14] has shown that an indirect sabotage attack is possible via a compro-
mised in-situ infrared thermography; authors evaluate identified attacks on a
metal 3D printer that employs the PBF process. Yampolskiy et al., 2016 [21]
argued that in the case of metal AM, manipulations of manufacturing parame-
ters can not only sabotage a part’s quality, but also damage the AM machine,
or lead to the contamination of its environment.
Several publications present methods for detecting sabotage attacks. Chhetri
et al., 2016 [3] used the acoustic side-channel inherent to the FDM process to
detect tampering with a 3D printed object; the authors report that the detec-
tion rate of object modifications is 77.45%. Strum et al., 2017 [16] proposed an
impedance-based monitoring method. The authors physically coupled a piezo-
ceramic (PZT) sensor to the part being fabricated and measure the electrical
impedance of the PZT. These impedance measurements can be directly linked
to the mechanical impedance of the part, assisting in detecting in-situ defects
of part mass and stiffness. Two further papers built upon the cross-domain at-
tack notion introduced in Yampolskiy et al., 2013 [19], and propose a notion of
cross-domain attack detection. Chhetri et al., 2017 [4] demonstrated the flow of
information between the cyber and physical domains and how this information
can be used for performing cross-domain security analysis. By estimating this
relationship, the model can be used for the detection of new cross-domain attack
models and attack detection techniques. Wu et al., 2017 [18] leverage machine
learning methods to detect cyber-attacks in the manufacturing process. The au-
thors have used vision and acoustics as the data sources for machine learning
algorithms and were able to detect anomalies with high accuracy (96.1% and
91.1% respectively).
3 Threat Model
3D printed objects generally begin as digital 3D models, stored on a computer.
The most common file format remains .STL, with emerging file formats like
.AMF or .3MF offering better accuracy and additional features like color. For
a 3D printing job, the 3D model is first “sliced” by a dedicated software (like
Slic3r) into layers; for each layer a toolpath is generated that defines exactly what
actuators (motors and similar 3D printer components) should act and in what
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Fig. 1. Considered Threat Model
sequence. Afterwards, the PC communicates to the 3D printer either the whole
toolpath or individual commands (for desktop 3D printers, usually in G-code).
For the communication either network protocols or a USB connection is utilized.
All commands are then interpreted and executed by the firmware installed on
the 3D Printer. If a command requests motion from an analog actuator, the
firmware “translates” it to the actuator’s input power supply characteristics,
such as frequency and voltage.
For sabotage attacks, researchers have compromised various elements of the
outlined 3D printing workflow. Moore et al., 2016 identified numerous vulner-
abilities in software, firmware, and communication protocols often employed in
desktop 3D printing niche. Belikovetsky et al., 2016 [2] used a phishing attack
to enable remote access to the controller PC. Sturm et al., 2014 [15] used mal-
ware running on the controller PC to automatically modify STL files. Do et
al., 2016 [5] exploited weaknesses in the communication protocol between the
controller PC and a 3D printer and were able to cancel a print or submit a new
job. Moore et al., 2017 [10] presented a wide range of attacks possible through
3D Printer firmware compromise.
We consider the following threat model (summarized in Figure 1):
– As a lesson learned from the demonstrated attacks, we assume that any com-
puterized element in the AM workflow (controller PC, 3D printer, computer
network) can be compromised.
– Analog actuators (e.g., stepper motors) cannot be compromised via cyber
means. We assume that actuators behaving according to characteristics of
5analog input (such as Variable Frequency Drives, VFD) are not compro-
mised.
– Destructive testing can provide high-confidence data about mechanical char-
acteristics and geometry of a manufactured 3D object. This information will
be used to validate that the 3D printing process has not been tampered
with. This approach is similar to the one used by Agrawal et al., 2007 [1] for
detecting hardware Trojans using IC fingerprinting.
– Our detection system (that includes induction probes, oscilloscope, and a
monitoring PC for data analysis) is air-gapped from the manufacturing en-
vironment and is not compromised. Results from destructive testing can be
used to (manually) confirm the benign nature of a recorded manufacturing
process.
– Electrical connections (of power monitoring system and of 3D Printing envi-
ronment) are not physically tampered with, so that they are identical during
both unaltered and maliciously modified manufacturing.
4 Proposed Solution
In this section, we outline the proposed approach, and provide details on how—
according to our proposal—power supply signatures should be generated and
compared.
4.1 Considered Approach
Our approach hinges on the direct, causative relation between the amplitude and
frequency of current delivered to a motor and the motor’s rotation. Any G-code
move command specifies an (X,Y,Z) position to move the extruder head to, a
speed to move at, and a path to get there. When these commands are received
by the printer, the firmware translates them into a series of motor activations.
The firmware communicates with the on-board motor controllers, which deliver
current at a given frequency and amplitude to actuate the motors.
This translation from G-code, to motor activations, to current, is fully de-
terministic. Moreover, a set of delivered current over time for each motor will
always result in the same printed object. The current in each motor is therefore
the penultimate representation of the object, which began as a 3D model file.
While various factors, including the mechanical arrangement of the motors, the
filament, and the temperature of the extruder and bed, may influence the trans-
lation from current to physical object, this analog representation is not alterable
by cyber means.
The current passing through a wire may be measured, nonintrusively, using
a current transformer. It can be sampled by an oscilloscope or digitizer; the
sequence of samples for each motor circuit across the duration of a print is a
measurement of the motor-current representation of the printed object.
Each trace in this representation is a series of (time, amplitude) data. If we
align traces at some consistent starting point, e.g., the beginning of the first print
6layer, we should see the following: for prints with identical G-code, the traces
will be equivalent, with periods of activity occuring at the same time and having
the same frequency, with some level of desync due to the limited precision of the
equipment. For prints with wholly different G-code, any alignment of the traces
will be accidental and temporary; the difference in amplitude at any given time
will vary from 0 to the full amplitude of the signal.
It follows from the above that prints with identical G-code, apart from some
number of malicious modifications, will behave like this: up until the first modi-
fied command, the traces will display the same average deviation from each other
as a comparison of two unmodified prints. When the first altered command is
reached, the deviation will begin to vary across the full amplitude range. De-
pending on the duration of the command, the traces could either re-sync, or
continue to produce the full range of deviations.
We propose an attack detection method based on the comparison of mo-
tor current traces. In brief, the method requires generating traces from several
known-good prints, collecting the current traces of subsequent prints of the same
object on that printer, and comparing the captured traces against the known-
good traces. Modifications are identified by deviations between the captured and
known-good traces being substantially different from the standard deviation. In
the remainder of this section, we describe the individual stages in more detail.
4.2 Trace Generation
For a single combination of G-code and printer, a set of traces must be captured
for each motor (or other actuator) involved in the printing process. The sample
rate of the trace must be above the Nyquist rate, i.e., at least double the rate
of the highest non-noise frequency component in the signal. The size of the
trace set is determined by the statistical power of the method. In general, it will
depend on the measurement error, standard deviation between “normal” traces,
expected deviation of a malicious trace, and the acceptable false positive and
negative rates.
An assumption of the method, as in the attack model, is that the printed
objects can be physically verified. If it is impossible to verify every required
property from a single object, it is sufficient to verify them from the same pool
of objects created while capturing the known-good trace data.
When printing the potentially compromised object, a trace for each actuator
must be captured, meeting the same standards as the known-good traces.
4.3 Comparison of Traces
Before comparing the traces, they must be time-aligned and preprocessed. Time-
alignment can be done by pattern matching software, but is more easily achieved
by a consistent hardware signal from the printer. Preprocessing should involve
smoothing the traces to minimize the impact of sampling noise and error on the
comparison. The smoothing method and strength must preserve the meaningful
components of the signal, i.e., those that strongly impact the operation of the
7motor or actuator. In the case of multiphase AC motors, these would be the
primary frequency components and their harmonics.
For each captured trace, compute the deviation across equivalent sample
points on a known-good trace from the same motor. If the captured trace does
not correspond to unmodified G-code, it will produce a deviation over time
similar to the standard deviation between known-good traces from that motor.
If it does correspond to modified G-code, the deviation will fluctuate across a
much larger range starting at the first modified command. The detection thresh-
old can be set in several ways; a simple version places a boundary above the
highest peak in the known-good deviation, and detects a print as malicious if a
certain number of samples have a larger deviation.
It may be useful to normalize the deviation of the captured trace to the
standard deviation, or to produce a measure of accumulated deviation over time.
These and other analysis methods are discussed in Future Work.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we first present our experimental setup and describe the experi-
ments performed. We then present and analyze our results.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Figure 2 presents our experimental setup. We are measuring the current delivered
by a single phase of the X, Y, and Z axis motors, along with the extruder motor.
To avoid reducing the delivered current or introducing phase shifts, we use a
noninvasive device: a Tektronix A622 AC/DC current probe. It is connected to a
Teledyne LeCroy Waverunner 610 Zi oscilloscope, running at a 25 KS/s sampling
rate. According to our preliminary evaluation, this was vastly in excess of the
major frequency components, which were expected in the 0-200 Hz range. We
are therefore we above the Nyquist rate for accurately sampling these signals,
which is double the highest frequency component. As there were no difficulties
collecting at the higher sampling rate, we did not reduce it.
To better synchronize our collected traces, we implemented a trigger signal.
We selected the 3D Printer’s extruder fan, as it was not one of the actuator
manipulations under test. The fan control line was pulled to an external resistor,
and set to generate a falling edge immediately before printing the first layer. This
triggered the oscilloscope to begin sampling.
The experiments were run using a Printrbot Plus 1404 desktop 3D printer,
employing Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM) technology. The printer uses Nema
17 stepper motors, rated for 4.2V and 1.5 A per phase.
A desktop PC using the Repetier-Host software controlled the print jobs.
Riscure Inspector performed the data preprocessing and analytics.
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Fig. 2. Experimental Environment
5.2 Experiments Performed
The goal of the experiments is to test the proposed solution and to evaluate its
sensitivity threshold to manipulations. While maliciously inserted print defects
might be small, as discussed in the literature, creating them can introduce signif-
icant changes to the G-code. This is because a slicer will have to “work around”
gaps or other changes. To produce smaller and more controllable manipulations,
we have altered individual G-code commands within a single print job.
We first designed a benign object, a 10 layer cube with a honeycomb fill. For
each of the X, Y, Z, and extruder motors, we collected a minimum of 10 traces
of the object being printed, representing 40 total prints. These measurements
established a baseline or “golden” measurement for the motors.
We next created manipulated copies of this object, with the following modi-
fications:
– Insertion of a new G-code command, a G0 move, in layer 7.
– Deletion of a G-code command present in the original STL file, a G1 move
in layer 7.
– A reordering of two G-code commands present in the original STL file, two
G1 moves in layer 7 and two more in layer 8.
– Replacement of a G1 command for simultaneous movement and filament
extrusion with the G0 movement only.
We collected at least 3 traces of each malicious print per motor. A comparison
against a known good trace produced the deviation over time. The detection
9Table 1. Results of the detection method on the considered attacks.
X Motor Y Motor Z Motor Extruder
Normal No (correct) No (correct) No (correct) No (correct)
Insert Yes Yes Visible Visible
Delete Yes Yes Visible Visible
Reorder Yes Yes Visible Visible
Void Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant Visible
threshold for attacks is 0.1 amps above the peak amplitude of the normal traces’
standard deviation.
5.3 Experimental Results
The experimental results are summarized in Table 1 and described below in
detail. All trace captures have been smoothed by a moving average filter spanning
20 samples.
Normal Operation Traces and Standard Deviations The X and Y motors’
normal operation produced a signal similar to our expectations. These motors
are active throughout most of the print. In Figure 3, a smaller timescale shows
that the active sections are strongly periodic, separated by constant-level sections
with high frequency noise.
The standard deviation of the X and Y traces (Figure 4) varies over time,
but remains below 0.5 A until after the print is completed at approximately 75
seconds.
Fig. 3. Normal X motor operation.
The Z motor traces show a different usage pattern. After the beginning of the
print, the Z motor is active infrequently (Figure 5); this matches the common-
sense observation that the Z motor is used only at layer transitions. This effect
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Fig. 4. Standard deviation of X traces over time.
also shows in the standard deviation plot (Figure 6). The deviation remains
constant for long periods, and is higher than the standard deviation of the X
and Y motor traces while inactive. This indicates the constant current levels
held between active periods are less consistent for the Z motor. As observed in
the other motors (Figure 3), the level holds where the previous periodic section
ended.
Fig. 5. Normal Z motor operation.
Fig. 6. Standard deviation of Z traces over time.
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Traces from the extruder motor show lower-frequency operation with very
few interruptions, but a consistently higher standard deviation (Figure 7).
Fig. 7. Standard deviation of extruder traces over time.
Insertion Attack The results of our method applied to an Insertion modified
object are in Figure 8. The execution of the extra command occurs between 52 s
and 53 s in the second trace; traces 1 and 2 are desynchronized by the duration
of the inserted command. This appears in the difference plot as an increase in
amplitude from below 0.5 A to nearly 2 A. After reducing the difference plot by
subtracting the standard deviation of normal X traces, the malicious section is
still clearly visible.
This attack was detected on the X and Y motors by a safe margin, as seen
in Figure 8. It was not detected on the Z or Extruder motors, as seen in Figure
9. The attacks were visible in the Z and Extruder traces, but did not result in
larger deviations during or after the attack period.
The detection failure on the Z trace is due to the very brief active period of
the Z motor. The time delay of a single command insertion is enough to misalign
the motor activity, producing the duplicated spikes seen in the final plot of Figure
9. Detection failure on the extruder motor is more likely due to the already high
standard deviation of the normal traces (Figure 7). The Extruder signal shows
much less synchronization than other motors. As is seen more clearly in the Void
attack (Figure 11), periods of inactivity or misalignment in the extruder do not
show substantially higher deviation.
Deletion Attack A Deletion attack produces similar deviations in all motors
to the Insertion attack; the amount of desynchronization introduced is nearly
identical. The detectability is the same in each case.
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Fig. 8. The analysis process for an Insertion attack.
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Fig. 9. Z motor behavior during an Insertion attack.
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Fig. 10. X motor deviation during a Reorder Attack.
Reorder Attack A Reorder attack produces the expected reversal of two ad-
jacent sections of samples, but also results in a greater than average deviation
after the G-code commands return to normal (Figure 10). This may be because
the reordered commands were both move commands, with a starting and ending
point specified. Swapping them creates a greater distance between the endpoint
of one move and the start point of the other, causing a delay.
Detectability of the attack is identical to the Insertion and Deletion attacks.
The high-activity X and Y motors show significant deviations due to the mis-
aligned active sections. The Z motor also shows misalignment, but the short
activity periods result in separate, smaller deviation spikes. The extruder mo-
tor deviation is even smaller than in the Insertion or Deletion attacks, but the
inactive time is still visible.
Void Attack During the Void attack, the inactive time due to the modification,
while similar in length to the X and Y motors in other attacks, is only a fraction of
a single cycle (Figure 11). The deviation across these sections is not substantially
higher than the maximum deviation throughout the print.
This attack is not detected in the X, Y, and Z traces; the deviation is below
the threshold set by the standard deviation for each. It was also not detected in
the extruder trace, but was clearly visible.
The X, Y, and Z detectability is expected for this attack; the modified code
did not alter the movement of the print head or bed z-level at all. The inability
of the method to detect changes in the extruder trace is due to the already high
deviation of these traces, and that the attacks do not significantly misalign the
traces. In fact, the extruder activity was almost 180◦ out of phase before the
attack section. The break in periodicity for the duration of the attack is clear,
however (Figure 11, final plot).
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Fig. 11. Extruder motor operation during a Void print.
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6 Discussion
While the proposed approach has shown impressive results in the tested experi-
mental setup, two questions should be discussed: (i) limitations of the approach,
and (ii) its applicability to metal AM systems.
6.1 Approach Limitations
Detection of effects on the Z-axis and extruder motors was not successful with
an absolute-deviation-based threshold, although the effects were visible in the
current traces. As the deviation is a result of comparing out of phase periodic
signals, a frequency-based measure may better detect these effects while still
detecting the effects on the X and Y motors.
It is possible that alterations to the G-code can produce a deviation in the
trace that is not detected by our method, which still results in a malicious effect.
For example, an accumulation of slight modifications to the movement speed of
the X, Y, and Z motors may eventually deposit significantly more filament; the
method would need to also detect small but prolonged deviations in this case.
Testing a wider range of possible G-code modifications would verify this.
Our methodology assumes an unmediated relationship between the param-
eters of the G-code commands and the resulting actuation signal. This is not
the case in closed-loop control systems, where the actuator signal is a function
of both the input commands and sensor feedback. In such cases, signals in the
feedback loop would also need to be captured.
6.2 Applicability to Metal AM Systems
While the proposed approach has shown good results for FDM technology, this
technology is predominantly used with plastics, a source material that has little
relevance for safety-critical applications. Two other AM processes are dominat-
ing the field in metal additive manufacturing: Powder Bed Fusion (PBF) and
Directed Energy Deposition (DED).
In PBF, a thin layer of powder is deposited in a bed and the next layer’s
profile is melted with a laser or electron beam. Applying the proposed approach
to a PBF system will likely require additional instrumentation of heat sources, in
order to detect changes in scanning strategies: Selective Laser Sintering/Melting
(SLS/SLM) might require a camera and an infrared image recognition system;
monitoring Electron Beam Melting (EBM) might utilize EM emanations instead.
DED systems employ a multi-axis arm, through a nozzle mounted on its
end melted material is deposited onto a surface, where it solidifies. The source
material is in either wire or powder form; it is melted using a laser, electron
beam, or plasma arc. The proposed approach may be directly applicable for
sabotage attack detection in DED systems if the motors controlling the arm can
be measured using the same techniques.
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7 Conclusion and Future Work
Additive Manufacturing (AM), a.k.a. 3D Printing, is increasingly adopted around
the world and used to produce functional parts of safety-critical systems. Be-
cause of AM’s dependence on computerization, there is a growing concern that
the AM process can be tampered with, in order to sabotage a part’s mechanical
properties. To address this threat, we proposed a novel approach for detecting
sabotage attacks in manufacturing systems. Our approach is based on the con-
tinuous monitoring of current supplied to all actuators during the manufacturing
process and detecting anomalies compared to a provable benign process.
The proposed approach has numerous advantages: (i) it is non-invasive in a
time-critical process (ii) it can be retrofitted in legacy systems, and (iii) it is air-
gapped from the computerized components involved in AM process, increasing
the difficulty of a simultaneous compromise. We have evaluated the proposed
approach on a desktop 3D Printer employing Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM)
technology. We monitored power supply to four motors: the X/Y/Z-axis motors,
and the filament extrusion motor. Our results show that the insertion, deletion,
and reordering of individual G-code movement commands can be detected with
100% precision through the X and Y motors. Modifications to extrusion rate are
visible, but not detectable with the current method.
This method can detect attacks depending on these modifications, which
includes many of the void-insertion attacks discussed in the literature and any
attacks relying on modifications to a 3D model file.
In our future work, we plan to overcome the identified limitations, including
restriction to open-loop AM systems, switching to a frequency-based deviation
measure, and accounting for the gradual accumulation of deviations. We will
also test the method against other FDM printers, and adapt it for other printing
technologies, such as Powder Bed Fusion and Directed Energy Deposition. The
demonstrated anomaly detection performance and the potential applicability to
metal AM systems makes the proposed approach an important milestone to
ensure AM security in safety-critical systems.
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